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1 
Cyber Espionage or Cyber War?:  International Law, Domestic 
Law, and Self-Protective Measures 
Christopher S Yoo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The academic discourse on cyberspace followed a pattern that is now well recognized. 
Early scholarship embraced cyber exceptionalism, pronouncing that the internet’s inherently 
transnational character transcended traditional notions of sovereignty and made it inherently 
unregulable by nation states.1 Others disagreed, arguing that the internet fell comfortably within 
established legal principles.2 Although President Clinton once confidently stated that China’s 
attempt to crack down on the internet was “like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall,”3 history has 
largely proven him wrong. As of today, belief in the internet’s unregulability is now essentially 
defunct, at least with respect to law.4 
The same debate over internet exceptionalism is currently playing out in the scholarship 
on international law, albeit with a much more skeptical tone. Early scholarship generally took the 
position that established international law principles governing when it is appropriate to go to 
                                                 
* The author would like to thank Jonathan Smith, who has been instrumental in shaping my thinking about cyber 
war, and Jean Galbraith and Bill-Burke White for comments on earlier drafts. The chapter also benefitted from 
presentations at the 8th Annual Symposium of the Global Internet Governance Academic Network held in 
conjunction with the Internet Governance Forum, as well as the Roundtable on “Cyberwar and the Rule of Law,” the 
Philadelphia Area Cyberlaw Colloquium, and the Conference on “Invisible Harms:  Intellectual Property, Privacy, 
and Security in a Global Network,” all held at the University of Pennsylvania. 
1 See, for example, John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, February 8, 1996, at <https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html>; David Johnson and 
David Post, “Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,” (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review1367, 1375. 
2 See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, “Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,” (1996) University of Chicago 
Legal Forum 207; Jack L. Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy,” (1998) 65 University of Chicago Law Review 1199. 
3 William J. Clinton, Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, March 8, 2000, in 
Public Papers of the President of the United States: January 1 to June 26, 2000 (2000) 404, 407. 
4 See, for example, Alex Kozinski and Josh Goldfoot, “A Declaration of the Dependence of Cyberspace,” (2009) 32 
Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 365; Tim Wu, “Is Internet Exceptionalism Dead?” in Berin Szoka and Adam 
Marcus (eds), The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet (Washington, DC: TechFreedom, 
2010) 179, 179–82, at <http://nextdigitaldecade.com/ndd_book.pdf>. 
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war (jus ad bellum) and the appropriate ways that war may be conducted (jus in bello) applied to 
cyber conflicts.5 By September 2012, US State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh could 
confidently declare that established principles of international law apply to cyberspace.6 More 
recently, scholarship has begun to raise doubts about this conclusion.7 Even those confident 
about the application of international law to cyber conflicts acknowledge that some types of 
cyber operations do not fit easily into the traditional categories.8 
This chapter will explore how these two bodies of international law governing conflicts 
between states applies to cyber operations, using as its lens prominent examples that have been 
in the news of late. These include the surveillance programs alleged by Edward Snowden to have 
been conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), the 2007 and 2008 distributed denial of 
service attacks launched by Russian hackers against Estonia and Georgia that disrupted their 
communications networks without damaging any property, and the 2008 Stuxnet virus 
introduced into a key Iranian nuclear facility that caused the centrifuges used to enrich uranium 
to accelerate and decelerate unexpectedly and eventually to destroy themselves. In addition, this 
chapter will examine the type of practices described in a 1999 book entitled Unrestricted 
Warfare, in which two Colonels of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) describe ways 
that a country in the position of China in the late 1990s could defeat an opponent that was in a 
stronger economic and technological position. The tactics describe in the book include lawfare 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Michael N Schmitt, “Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on a Normative Framework,” (1999) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885; Walter Gary Sharp, 
Sr, CyberSpace and the Use of Force (Falls Church, VA: Aegis Research Corp, 1999). 
6 Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, US Department of State, “International Law in Cyberspace,” Remarks, before 
the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference, Ft. Meade, Maryland, September 18, 2012, at <http:// 
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm>. 
7 See Susan W. Brenner and Leo L. Clarke, “Civilians in Cyber war: Conscripts,” (2010) 43 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1011; Jack M. Beard, “Legal Phantoms in Cyberspace: The Problematic Status of Information as 
a Weapon and a Target Under International Humanitarian Law,” (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law 67. 
8 See, for example, Sharp (n 5); Koh (n 6). 
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(ie, the use of international and multilateral organizations to subvert an opponent’s policies), 
manipulation of trade, manipulation of financial transactions, as well as network warfare 
(cyberwarfare) targeted at a nation’s financial and communications systems, just to name a few.9 
Section II applies current principles as understood through the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare produced by a special Independent Group of 
Experts (IGE) convened by NATO, concluding that jus ad bellum and jus in bello as well as the 
customary international law of non-intervention will not reach much, if any, of this behavior. 
Instead, such conduct is relegated to the law of espionage, described in section III, which is 
governed almost entirely by domestic law. The absence of an overarching legal solution to this 
problem heightens the importance of technological self-protective measures, described in section 
IV. 
II. THE APPLICABILITY OF JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND NON-INTERVENTION 
The law of war is dominated by two bodies of law that govern hostile activities among 
states.10 Jus ad bellum determines when a use of force is justified. Jus in bello governs how states 
should conduct themselves during periods of armed conflict. The literature exploring these 
concepts is too voluminous to cite comprehensively and will only be sketched here, primarily by 
referring to the leading primary sources of international law as well as the interpretation offered 
by the Tallinn Manual as to how these principles will apply to cyber operations. Admittedly, the 
exposition presented in the Manual glosses over many important ongoing debates. As the leading 
                                                 
9 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of 
Globalization (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999). 
10 To date the scholarly debate has focused primarily on the application of these two areas of law to cyber war. That 
said, they do not represent the only relevant bodies of international law. For example, some scholars have begun to 
explore the extent to which human rights treaties govern electronic surveillance.  See, for example, Marko 
Milanovic, “Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age,” (forthcoming) 56 
Harvard International Law Journal, draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2418485. 
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source on how the law of war applies to cyber conflicts, it does provide an important cornerstone 
for analysis. 
As we shall see, the threshold determination for the applicability of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello has been whether the damage to persons or property is analogous to those inflicted by 
traditional kinetic war. This standard leaves many of the types of cyber operations that have 
raised the greatest concern outside the scope of the law of war. 
(a) Jus ad Bellum 
Although the principles on when international law permits nations to go to war have a 
long history, the starting point for modern analysis is the Charter of the United Nations. 
Although the Charter is by no means the only relevant source of law, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has recognized that the Charter’s restrictions on the use of force have become part 
of the customary international law of jus ad bellum.11 
Two provisions of the UN Charter have particular importance. Article 2(4) of the Charter 
specifically bans the use of force against other states when it provides, “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations.” The Charter recognizes certain exceptions to the prohibition of 
the use of force. In particular, Article 51 recognizes that nothing in the Charter abrogates states’ 
“inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.” 
                                                 
11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US), 1986 ICJ 14, paras 188–90 (June 
27). 
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In addition to jus ad bellum, nations are also subject to the duty of nonintervention. 
Article 2(1) recognizes the “principle of sovereign equality” among UN members, which implies 
a principle of nonintervention preventing other states from taking actions that deprives another 
state of the ability to control governmental matters implicit in being a state. Although the precise 
contours of what constitutes intervention have long been the subject of extensive debate, the ICJ 
has recognized that intervention is wrongful when it constitutes coercion.12 
The key concepts are thus the conduct that is prohibited by Article 2(4) (threat or use of 
force) and the occurrence that triggers the Article 51 exception to that prohibition (armed attack) 
as well as the threshold for the principle of nonintervention implicit in Article 2(1) (coercion). 
Although the most aggressive forms of cyber operations would fall within the scope of these 
terms, many forms of cyber surveillance and interference would not.13 
i. Use of force 
We begin our analysis with the use of force, which is the primary conduct prohibited by 
Article 2(4). No treaty provides a definition of the use of force, although the UN Charter does 
provide some guidance. For example, other Charter provisions offer guidance as to the types of 
conduct that fall within Article 2(4). The Charter’s preamble clearly stated the signatory nations’ 
determination “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” by “ensur[ing] . . . that 
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest.” This language is generally regarded 
as establishing that armed military operations within another country would constitute a use of 
force prohibited by Article 2(4). Furthermore, in describing measures that the Security Council 
may take that do “not involve[e] the use of armed force,” Article 41 specifically includes the 
                                                 
12 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 205. 
13 For other enlightening discussions, see also Watts (Chapter 4, this volume), Blank (Chapter 5, this volume), and 
Hollis (Chapter 6, this volume). 
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“complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication.” This suggests that not all disruptive operations 
constitute the use of force. 
The travaux préparatoire of Article 2(4) reveals that the San Francisco Conference 
specifically rejected an amendment that would have included economic coercion within the 
scope of the use of force prohibited by Article 2(4).14 Moreover, when considering a draft 
containing language that paralleled Article 2(4), the UN Commission on Friendly Relations 
rejected arguments that all forms of political and economic pressure fell within its scope.15 
This interpretation is reinforced by principles of customary international law, particularly 
the aspect of ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment rejecting Nicaragua’s claim that US funding of the 
contras constituted an impermissible use of force. Although the ICJ lacked the jurisdiction to 
determine whether those actions violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, it did have the authority 
to determine whether the actions taken by the US violated customary international law. The ICJ 
concluded that “organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands . . 
. for incursion into the territory of another State” and “participating in acts of civil strife . . . in 
another State” did constitute an impermissible use of force. At the same time, the ICJ ruled that 
“the mere supply of funds to the contras . . . does not in itself amount to a use of force.”16 
                                                 
14 6 UN CIO Docs. 334, 609 (1945); Doc. 2, 617 (e) (4), 3 UN CIO Docs. 251, 253–4 (1945). This drafting history 
also rebuts arguments that the use of the term “force” without the word “armed” in Article 2(4) suggested that 
Article 2(4) prohibits economic coercion that does not rise to the level of military action. This underscores that the 
primary impetus for the creation of the UN was to outlaw armed conflict as a legitimate instrument for effectuating 
national policy rather than to insulate countries from all imbalances in economic bargaining position. See Tom J 
Farer, “Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary International Law,” (1985), 79 American Journal of 
International Law 405, 410; Schmitt (n 5) 905; Marco Roscini, “World Wide Warfare—Jus ad Bellum and the Use 
of Cyber Force,” (2010) 14 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 85, 105. 
15 UN GAOR Special Comm. on Friendly Relations, UN Doc. A/AC.125/SR.110 to 114 (1970); Rep. of the Special 
Comm. On Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, 1969, UN GAOR, 24th Session, Supp. No 19, at 12, 
UN Doc. A/7619 (1969). 
16 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 228. 
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The Tallinn Manual drew guidance from the ICJ’s focus on scale and effects when 
determining whether conduct constituted an armed attack. Moreover, the IGE that authored the 
Tallinn Manual took note of the historical materials indicating that the use of force excluded 
mere economic and political pressure and concluded that cyber operations analogous to such 
activities, such as psychological operations or funding a hacktivist group, did not constitute uses 
of force, nor would providing sanctuary or safe haven for those mounting cyber operations 
unless coupled with other acts.17 Actions taken by a state’s intelligence agency or a contractor 
whose conduct is attributable to a state can constitute a use of force despite the fact that it was 
not undertaken by the state’s armed forces.18 
The heart of the Tallinn Manual’s proposal was to identify cyber operations to kinetic 
operations that the international community would clearly recognize as uses of force, including 
all conduct that rose to the level of armed attack and acts that injure or kill persons or damage or 
destroy objects.19 For other cases, the IGE put forward eight nonexclusive factors to guide the 
inquiry: severity, immediacy, directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military 
character, state involvement, and presumptive legality.20 The Manual observed that “actions such 
as disabling cyber security mechanisms in order to monitor keystrokes would, despite their 
invasiveness, be unlikely to be seen as a use of force.”21 
Measured against this standard, the type of surveillance described in the classified 
documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, lacking as it did any injury to people or property, 
would not likely rise to the level to constitute a use of force. Similarly, the use of lawfare or 
                                                 
17 Michael N Schmitt (ed), The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 47–9. 
18 Schmitt (n 17) 46. 
19 Schmitt (n 17) 49. 
20 Schmitt (n 17) 49–52. 
21 Schmitt (n 17) 50–1. 
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economic warfare through the erection of trade barriers or financial transactions would almost 
certainly not constitute uses of force. Presumably neither would the partial disruption of 
communications recognized by Article 41 of the UN Charter. And, as we shall see in subsection 
ii, intrusion into another state’s systems by breaching firewalls and cracking passwords fails to 
violate nonintervention; because that standard is lower than the standard governing the use of 
force, a fortiori this type of conduct does not constitute use of force. 
Attacks on a nation’s financial or cyber infrastructure of the type envisioned by 
Unrestricted Warfare are a matter of degree. Temporary denial of service would be insufficient 
to constitute a use of force even if highly invasive. At the same time, “some may categorize 
massive cyber operations that cripple an economy as a use of force even though economic 
coercion is presumptively lawful.”22 The Tallinn Manual does, moreover, presume that Stuxnet 
constituted a use of force,23 
ii. Self-defense 
Another key concept under traditional international law is when a state may act in self-
defense. As noted earlier, a nation may exercise its inherent right of self-defense under Article 51 
of the UN Charter when confronted with an armed attack. 
Because the UN Charter does not provide a definition of armed attack, customary 
international law and treaty law coexist side by side.24 The ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment 
distinguished between “the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed 
attack) from other less grave forms” and noted that “measures which do not constitute an armed 
                                                 
22 Schmitt (n 17) 55–6. 
23 Schmitt (n 17) 47. 
24 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 176. 
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attack . . . may nevertheless involve a use of force.”25 In so doing, the ICJ recognized that armed 
attack is a subset of the use of force. Thus, while all forms of armed attack constitute uses of 
force, not all uses of force constitute armed attacks. This in turn implies that states may be the 
targets of operations that are sufficiently severe to constitute uses of force that are illegal under 
Article 2(4), but not sufficiently severe to justify responding in kind under Article 51.26 
The ICJ further noted that in addition to sending regular forces across an international 
border, armed attack also includes “‘sending . . . armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to’ (inter 
alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement 
therein.’”27 The ICJ further observed that some instances of sending armed bands into the 
territory might represent “a mere frontier incident” rather than an armed attack.28 In short, 
whether particular conduct constitutes an armed attack depends on its “scale and effects.”29 The 
ICJ seemed to entertain the possibility that a series of smaller actions might constitute an armed 
attack if considered together.30 Any actions taken in self-defense to an armed attack are subject 
to the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality.31 
In applying these principles to cyberspace, the commentary on Rule 13 governing self-
defense against armed attack noted that the IGE “unanimously concluded that some cyber 
operations may be sufficiently grave to warrant classifying them as an ‘armed attack’ within the 
                                                 
25 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, paras 191, 210; see also Oil Platforms (Iran v US), judgment, 2003 ICJ 161, paras 51, 
64 (November 6). 
26 Michael N Schmitt, “‘Attack’ as a Term of Art in International Law: The Cyber Operations Context,” in Christian 
Czosseck, Rain Ottis, and Katharina Ziolkowski (eds), Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict (CYCON 2012) (Tallinn, Estonia: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012), 283, 286–7. 
27 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 195 (quoting Declaration on the Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), 
UN Doc A/RES/29/3314 (December 14, 1974)). 
28 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 195. 
29 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 195. 
30 ICJ Oil Platforms judgment, para 64. 
31 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, paras 176, 194; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 ICJ 226, para 41 (July 8); ICJ Oil Platforms judgment, paras 43, 74, 76. 
10 
meaning of the Charter.”32 A majority of the IGE agreed that the term “armed” did not require 
the employment of weapons.33 The IGE concurred that to constitute an armed attack, conduct 
must exceed the scale and effects needed to qualify as a use of force.34 On the one hand, the IGE 
agreed that any force that injures or kills persons or damages or destroys property would have 
sufficient scale and effects to constitute an armed attack. On the other hand, the IGE also agreed 
that acts of cyber intelligence, cyber theft, and brief or periodic interruptions of nonessential 
cyber services do not constitute armed attacks.35 
How to characterize intermediate cases divided the IGE. Some members held that some 
harm to persons or property is necessary for an incident to be considered an armed attack, while 
others focused on the severity of the broader effects.36 For example, some would describe a 
cyber assault on the New York Stock Exchange as mere financial loss that did not rise to the 
level of armed attack, while others focused on the catastrophic effects of such an attack.37 The 
IGE also disagreed as to the role of intent, with a majority focusing exclusively on scale and 
effects and a minority refusing to characterize cyber espionage that unexpectedly inflicted 
significant damage to another state’s cyber infrastructure as an armed attack.38  
The Tallinn Manual included rules imposing principles of necessity, proportionality, 
imminence, and immediacy.39 But application of these rules to cyber conflicts proved 
controversial. The debate over imminence provides an apt illustration. Although Article 51 on its 
face applies when “an armed attack occurs,” a majority of the IGE held that a state may defend 
itself against armed attacks that are “imminent,” while a minority rejected the concept of 
                                                 
32 Schmitt (n 17) 54. 
33 Schmitt (n 17) 54. 
34 Schmitt (n 17) 54. 
35 Schmitt (n 17) 55. 
36 Schmitt (n 17) 55. 
37 Schmitt (n 17) 55. 
38 Schmitt (n 17) 56. 
39 Schmitt (n 17) 59–63. 
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anticipatory self-defense.40 While the IGE agreed that the speed of cyber operations dictated that 
a state need not wait until an attack had already been launched before responding, a minority 
would have required that an attack be about to be launched, while a majority “rejected this strict 
temporal analysis” in favor a “last feasible window of opportunity” standard that permits self-
defense when failure to act would reasonably leave a state unable to defend itself effectively 
once the attack commences.41 
Although the Tallinn Manual found it “indisputable” that actions of non-state actors may 
constitute an armed attack if undertaken under the direction of a state, the IGE divided over the 
legal implications of such actions in the absence of any direction by a state. A majority 
concluded that state practice supported the exercise of the right of self-defense against non-state 
actors such as terrorists and rebel groups, which in the cyber context would extend to actions 
taken by information technology corporations, while a minority disagreed.42 
If the state from which the non-state actors are launching their cyber armed attack (which 
the Tallinn Manual calls the territorial state) consents, the victim state may take self-defensive 
actions against non-state actors within the territorial state.43 The IGE divided on how to address 
situations in which the territorial state does not consent to self-defensive actions by the victim 
state, but remains unable or unwilling to stop the cyber armed attack. A majority of the IGE 
concluded that self-defensive actions by the victim state within the territorial state are 
permissible as a result of the duty of each state to ensure that its territory is not used to violate 
international law.44 When confronted with such an attack, the victim state may ask the state from 
which the non-state cyber operations constituting a cyber armed attack are emanating (called the 
                                                 
40 Schmitt (n 17) 60–61. 
41 Schmitt (n 17) 61. 
42 Schmitt (n 17) 56–57. 
43 Schmitt (n 17) 26, 58. 
44 Schmitt (n 17) 58. 
12 
territorial state) to address the situation.45 A minority disagreed, arguing that such actions were 
impermissible absent an action based on a plea of necessity.46 
How would these principles apply to the real world examples under consideration? The 
Tallinn Manual concluded that as of 2012, no cyber incidents had occurred that had generally 
been recognized as constituting an armed attack, including the 2007 cyber operations against 
Estonia.47 Under these standards, because the surveillance programs described in the documents 
disclosed by Edward Snowden did not represent a use of force, a fortiori it also did not constitute 
an armed attack. If, as noted already, monitoring keystrokes did not rise to the lower standard of 
the use of force, it necessarily did not constitute an armed attack. Moreover, courts would likely 
not categorize the types of operations suggested by Unrestricted Warfare, lawfare and economic 
warfare through manipulation of trade or the financial transactions as armed attacks. Whether 
direct actions against the financial infrastructure itself that caused it to crash would meet the 
standard of armed attack divided the IGE. 
Most interestingly, the IGE did not regard Stuxnet, often regarded as the strongest real-
world candidate for being classified as an armed attack, as completely clear. Although the 
Tallinn Manual indicates that some IGE members believed that the damage to the Iranian 
centrifuges was sufficient to reach the level of armed attack,48 the clear implication is that other 
IGE members thought otherwise. 
(b). Nonintervention/coercion 
Customary international law has long recognized the principle of nonintervention to be 
implicit in the principles of sovereignty and the equality among nations. In its Nicaragua 
                                                 
45 Schmitt (n 17) 59. 
46 Schmitt (n 17) 59. 
47 Schmitt (n 17) 56. 
48 Schmitt (n 17) 56. 
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judgment, the ICJ recognized that nonintervention “forbids all States . . . to intervene directly or 
indirectly in internal or external affairs of other States.” It also ruled, “Intervention is wrongful 
when it uses methods of coercion in regard to” a nation’s “choice of a political, economic, social 
and cultural system, and the formulation of foreign policy.” The relevant level of coercion “is 
particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which uses force, either in the direct form of 
military action, or in the indirect form of support for subversive or terrorist armed activities 
within another State.”49 
Under this standard, the ICJ found that the US’s “financial support, training, supply of 
weapons, intelligence and logistic support” for the contras “constitute[d] a clear breach of the 
principle of non-intervention.”50 Such conduct clearly met the relevant standard of coercion.51 
Moreover, although simply funding the contras did not constitute a use of force, it was 
“undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua.”52 On the other hand, 
humanitarian assistance would not constitute intervention,53 nor would cessation of economic aid 
or the imposition of a trade quota or an embargo.54 
The Tallinn Manual recognized that cyber conduct that does not rise to the level of a use 
of force may nonetheless constitute a violation of nonintervention.55 At the same time, “not all 
cyber interference automatically violates the international law prohibition on intervention,” 
including cyber espionage and cyber exploitation lacking a coercive element as well as mere 
intrusion into another state’s systems even when such intrusion requires abrogating virtual 
                                                 
49 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 205. 
50 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 242. 
51 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 241. 
52 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 228. 
53 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 242. 
54 ICJ Nicaragua judgment, para 245. 
55 Schmitt (n 17) 46. 
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barriers such as breaching firewalls or cracking passwords.56 Whether other cases violate 
nonintervention depends on the circumstances. For example, attempts to achieve regime change 
by manipulating elections or public opinion in advance of elections constitute improper 
intervention, while lesser forms of political and economic interference do not.57 
Measured against these standards, the surveillance practices described in the classified 
documents disclosed by Edward Snowden represented nothing more than the type of surveillance 
that the Tallinn Manual did not regard as constituting intervention. Lawfare similarly lacks a 
coercive element, and economic warfare through the erection of trade barriers or financial 
transactions would represent little more than the selection of trade partners that the ICJ deemed 
permissible. Whether a more direct assault on a nation’s financial or cyber infrastructure of the 
type envisioned by Unrestricted Warfare would constitute intervention is less clear. Because 
nonintervention represents a lower threshold than the use of force, the fact that the Tallinn 
Manual presumes that Stuxnet constituted a use of force means that Stuxnet must necessarily 
constitute a violation of nonintervention as well.58 
(c) Jus in Bello 
During periods of armed conflict, state conduct is governed by jus in bello. The primary 
sources of law are the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols I and II of June 
8, 1977, as well as customary international law. Specifically, these include the principles of 
distinction, which requires parties to target only those engaged in fighting, and proportionality, 
which requires parties to forbear from acting when the likely civilian casualties would exceed the 
anticipated military advantage. 
                                                 
56 Schmitt (n 17) 47. 
57 Schmitt (n 17) 47. 
58 Schmitt (n 17) 47. 
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Jus in bello applies only if certain threshold considerations are met; it applies only under 
circumstances constituting “armed conflict;” it places restrictions on states when taking actions 
deemed to constitute “attacks;” and it only applies to actions by state actors and non-state actors 
under their control. Many common types of cyber operations that are of public concern fall 
outside the scope of jus in bello. 
i. Armed conflict 
As noted earlier, jus in bello applies only in the presence of an armed conflict. The 
Geneva Conventions distinguish between two types of armed conflicts: international armed 
conflict, defined as armed conflict among two or more states, and non-international armed 
conflict, defined as armed conflict within a state between the armed forces of a state and one or 
more armed groups or between  organized armed groups.59 
Although the treaties do not define armed conflict, Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II 
to the Geneva Conventions established that “situations of internal disturbances and tensions, 
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature” do not 
constitute armed conflict.60 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has also ruled that armed conflict arises “whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States.”61 In making this determination, the Tribunal focused on two key criteria—the 
intensity of the hostilities and the organization of the parties62—and has developed factors by 
                                                 
59 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31, Articles 2 and 3. 
60 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
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which to evaluate them.63 The actions of a non-state organized group may be attributed to a state 
if that state exercises “overall control” over that group.64 Support, such as through financing, 
training, equipping, and providing operational assistance, is not sufficient to establish overall 
control.65 The ICJ has mentioned the overall-control test favorably without adopting it, instead 
applying a test that focuses on effective control.66 Although some IGE members argued that an 
international armed conflict can exist between a state and a non-state armed group whose actions 
cannot be attributed a state, a majority of the IGE rejected that position. Instead, the Tallinn 
Manual regards such a situation as a non-international armed conflict. The IGE incorporated the 
intensity and organization standard established by ICTY for determining when a non-
international armed conflict exists.67 When these criteria are met, these situations are subject to 
many aspects of the law of armed conflict, including criminal responsibility of commanders, the 
principles of distinction and proportionality, the obligation and to respect medical and U.N. 
personnel, journalists, cultural property, and diplomatic archives, and to protect detained persons, 
although principles such as combatant status and belligerent immunity do not apply.68 
The Tallinn Manual recognizes that jus in bello in the context of cyber operations 
requires the presence of an armed conflict.69 The IGE concluded that armed conflict requires the 
existence of hostilities, which in turn “presuppose the collective application of means and 
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methods of warfare, consisting of kinetic and/or cyber operations.”70 IGE members disagreed as 
to whether a single cyber incident was sufficient to satisfy the requisite threshold of violence to 
constitute international armed conflict.71 Consistent with Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol II, 
they did agree that “[s]poradic cyber incidents, including those that directly cause physical 
damage or injury,” as well as that “cyber operations that incite incidents such as civil unrest or 
domestic terrorism” do not constitute non-international armed conflict.72 Similarly insufficient 
are “network intrusions, the deletion or destruction of data (even on a large scale), computer 
network exploitation, and data theft” and “[t]he blocking of certain internet functions and 
services.”73 The IGE divided over whether such cyber operations conducted during civil 
disturbances or combined with other acts of violence or nondestructive but severe cyber 
operations might satisfy the criterion.74 
Turning now to our motivating cases, the IGE noted that no cyber operation has been 
publicly characterized as an international armed conflict.75 The Tallinn Manual makes clear that 
none of the surveillance practices described in the classified documents disclosed by Edward 
Snowden even arguably constituted armed conflict. The damage-free denial of service attack 
against Estonia and calls by the Russian minority for civil unrest in 2007 also did not rise to the 
level of armed conflict either in terms of harm or organization, but the similar cyber operations 
against Georgia in 2008, which took place in conjunction with military operations, did.76 Neither 
lawfare nor the economic warfare through trade barriers or financial transactions described in 
Unrestricted Warfare would constitute armed conflict, nor would presumably more active 
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attempts to overwhelm the financial or cyber infrastructure.77 The IGE could not even come to 
agreement as to whether Stuxnet inflicted sufficient damage to constitute an armed conflict.78 
ii Attacks 
In addition, Additional Protocol I requires distinction and proportionality when states 
engage in certain activities. For example, Article 48 implements distinction by requiring that “the 
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”79 More specifically, Articles 51(2) and (4) and 52(1) 
prohibit signatory parties from launching an “attack” on a civilian population or on civilian 
objects or from indiscriminate attacks.80 Article 51(5)(b) similarly implements proportionality by 
prohibiting any “attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and directly military advantage anticipated.”81 
Article 49(1) defines attacks as “acts of violence against the adversary, whether in 
offence or defence.”82 Accompanying commentaries emphasize that attack refers to “combat 
action”83 and “physical force” and does not apply to the “dissemination of propaganda, 
embargoes, or other non-physical means of psychological or economic warfare” or to “military 
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movement or maneuver as such.”84 It bears mentioning that the concept of attack in jus in bello 
plays a role that is far different from the concept of armed attack in jus ad bellum. The former is 
the trigger for a range of legal protections for civilian populations, whereas the latter serves to 
authorize the use of force in self-defense against another state. 
Rule 31 of the Tallinn Manual provides that “[t]he principle of distinction applies to 
cyber attacks,” while Rule 32 incorporates the principle that civilians and civilian objects may 
not be attacked.85 Rule 30 defines a cyber attack as “a cyber operation, whether offensive or 
defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or 
destruction to objects.”86 
The Tallinn Manual commentary on attacks emphasizes the concept of violence used in 
Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I as the key concept that distinguishes attacks from other 
military operations and lists psychological cyber operations and cyber espionage as nonviolent 
operations that do not qualify as attacks.87 As the precedents on chemical, biological, and 
radiological weapons indicate, attacks do not have to have a kinetic effect in order to be violent 
so long as they foreseeably have the consequences set for in the rule.88 For example, a cyber 
operation targeted at an electrical grid that starts a fire would qualify; de minimis damage or 
destruction would not.89 
The IGE agreed that cyber operations targeted at data could constitute an attack. The IGE 
divided over whether cyber interference with the functionality of an object could constitute a 
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cyber attack, with a majority opining in the affirmative and a minority in the negative.90 While an 
attack on a computer-based control system for an electrical grid that requires the replacement of 
components would constitute an attack, IGE members disagreed over whether an attack that 
required reinstallation of the operating system or the restoration of data might qualify as an 
attack.91 The IGE agreed that cyber operations that do not cause damage, but result in nationwide 
blocking of email or other similar large-scale adverse consequences would not constitute an 
attack.92 Introduction of malware or latent defects that are capable of launching an attack would, 
however, as would attacks that are successfully intercepted by firewalls, antivirus software, or 
other protective systems.93 
The surveillance programs described in the classified documents disclosed by Edward 
Snowden would not rise to the level of injury to persons, damage to objects, or violence to 
constitute an attack under the criteria laid out in the Tallinn Manual, nor would apparently the 
type of denial of service attack directed against Estonia in 2007, although a similar attack that is 
part of a wider operation, as was the case in Georgia in 2008, would.94 The same would apply to 
the lawfare and economic warfare through trade barriers and financial transactions described in 
Unrestricted Warfare, nor would presumably more active attempts to disrupt the financial or 
cyber infrastructure so long as they did not cause physical damage. The IGE did not offer an 
assessment as to the application of these principles to Stuxnet, although one could surmise that if 
introducing a bug into the control system for an electric grid that caused a fire would constitute 
an attack, so would introducing a bug into a control system that led to the destruction of 
centrifuges. 
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iii. Attribution to the state 
In addition to constituting an armed conflict, the acts must be attributable to a state for jus 
in bello to apply. According to the International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts, states are responsible for private actors who are operating 
under their direction and control.95 The ICJ and ICTY have ruled that the conduct of non-state 
actors may be attributed to the state if the state exercises “effective control” or “overall 
control.”96 
As an initial matter, the inherent anonymity of internet-based communications makes the 
true source of a packet hard, if not impossible, to verify. Furthermore, many attacks rely on 
botnets where a bot controller can use thousands or millions of infected computers to launch an 
attack without their owners’ permission or awareness. The fact that many cyberwar capabilities 
are developed and executed by private companies raises questions when this conduct may be 
fairly attributed to the state. Such groups must be organized; collective activity of “hacktivists” 
acting independently is not sufficient.97 
Perhaps the most corrosive aspect of cyberwarfare is its tendency to break down the 
preconditions needed to support cooperation. International law scholarship typically falls into 
two traditions. The first views states as rational actors that cooperate only when it is in their self-
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interest to do so.98 The second believes that international law embodies a set of norms that states 
feel some obligation to follow.99 
Both approaches find aspects of cyber war that destabilize cooperation. Both function 
best when the number of relevant actors is relatively small and when information about 
compliance and noncompliance is highly visible and attributable.100 Unfortunately, cyber 
operations weaken both considerations. The fact that cyber conflicts can be waged relatively 
cheaply when compared with kinetic war radically increases the number of relevant players. 
Moreover, the fact that participants need not be geographically proximate to any location and can 
anonymize their identities makes information about their conduct much harder to perceive and to 
verify. One would expect the emergence of cyber operations to cause the informal governance 
structures on which international law relies to weaken. 
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW OF ESPIONAGE 
With a few narrow exceptions, jus ad bellum and jus in bello does not govern the type of 
information gathering or interference that characterize cyber operations such as the type of 
surveillance described in the confidential documents disclosed by Edward Snowden, the denial 
of service attacks directed at Estonia, or the type of measures described in Unrestricted Warfare. 
Indeed, the initial section regarding the scope of the Tallinn Manual explicitly notes that it does 
not address such matters as “[c]yber espionage, theft of intellectual property, and a wide variety 
of criminal activities in cyberspace” because “the international law on uses of force and armed 
                                                 
98 For example, Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 5th edn, 1973); Jack L Goldsmith and Eric A Posner, The Limits of International Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
99 For example, Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2nd edn, 1979); 
Harold Hongju Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599. 
100 Robert C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1991). 
23 
conflict plays little or no role” with respect to those subjects.101 It explains why the IGE 
members did not regard practices such as monitoring keystrokes, breaching firewalls, cracking 
passwords, or intruding into another state’s systems as a use of force for purposes of jus ad 
bellum.102 It also explains why they did not “network intrusions, the deletion or destruction of 
data (even on a large scale), computer network exploitation, . . . data theft,” “[t]he blocking of 
certain internet functions and services, and the nationwide disruption of email as constituting an 
armed conflict for purposes of jus in bello.”103 
Instead, this type of conduct falls within the province of the law of espionage. Sometimes 
called the second oldest profession,104 espionage traces its roots back to ancient Egypt, Greece, 
Rome, and China.105 Indeed, the great seventeenth-century legal scholar Hugo Grotius noted that 
“there is no doubt, but the law of nations allows anyone to send spies, as Moses did to the land of 
promise, of whom Joshua was one.”106 The law of espionage has remained relatively 
undeveloped, with what little work that exists focusing on espionage during times of war, with 
the most salient example being the Hague Regulations provision providing that “a spy who, after 
re-joining the army to which he belongs, is subsequently captured by the enemy, is treated as a 
prisoner of war, and incurs no responsibility for his previous acts of spying.”107 Thus, Falk’s 
admonition that “[t]raditional international law is remarkably oblivious to the peacetime practice 
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of espionage” continues to hold true today.108 Indeed, the ICJ appears to be going out of its way 
to avoid creating opinio juris with respect to peacetime espionage.109 
Scholars have divided sharply on the legality of peacetime espionage. The majority of 
scholars assert that it is legal, pointing to the predominance of the practice and asserting that 
better information about what other countries are doing promotes stability and is implicit in the 
right of preemptive self-defense.110 Others disagree, condemning it as an impressible violation of 
the spied-upon country’s territorial integrity.111 Still others assert that the legal status of 
espionage remains ambiguous, with international law neither condemning nor condoning it.112 In 
the absence of any clear principles, with the exception of a handful of exceptions such as 
interference with diplomatic communiques, espionage remains the province of domestic law and 
falls outside the province of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 
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A literature has only begun to emerge regarding cyber espionage.113 There are aspects of 
cyber espionage that may change the optimal outcome. On the one hand, as was the case with 
satellite surveillance,114 the lack of territorial invasion makes cyber surveillance less 
problematic.115 On the other hand, the dramatic drop in the cost of surveillance and the lower 
likelihood of apprehension may lead firms to engage in it when before the benefits did not justify 
the costs. Some regard this as a benefit, as the nonlethal aspects of cyber capabilities make them 
preferable to other means.116 Others take the contrary view, arguing that because cyber espionage 
increases the scale of intelligence-gathering capability, it should be curbed by treating it more 
severely than traditional espionage.117 Still others support doing nothing and allowing state 
practices to evolve.118 In any event, general agreement never emerged with respect to traditional 
espionage, and there seems little reason to expect that consensus is more likely to appear in the 
cyber context. 
The law of war, thus, has little to say about the types of surveillance that are generating 
the most concern. That is why Rule 66(a) of the Tallinn Manual explicitly states, “Cyber 
espionage and other forms of information gathering directed at an adversary during an armed 
conflict do not violate the law of armed conflict.”119 The commentary similarly notes that cyber 
espionage does not constitute the use of force or armed attack for purposes of jus ad bellum, 
armed conflict or attack for purposes of jus in bello, or a violation of the principle of 
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nonintervention.120 It also explains why the commentary notes at several points that international 
law does not address espionage per se and that, as such, conduct related to espionage is 
presumptively legal as a matter of international law.121 
Even more tellingly, the Tallinn Manual commentary distinguishes between cyber 
espionage, which necessarily takes place in territory controlled by one of the parties to the armed 
conflict, from computer network exploitation and cyber reconnaissance, which are conducted 
from outside enemy controlled territory. Such conduct is not cyber espionage at all.122 
The type of activities described in the classified documents disclosed by Edward 
Snowden, the denial of service attack on Estonia, and the tactics described in Unrestricted 
Warfare are, thus, not governed by international law at all. The legality of such conduct is 
consigned instead to domestic law. 
IV. POTENTIAL CYBER WARFARE DEFENSE STRATEGIES 
Given the unlikely prospect of legal solutions to the problems posed by cyber war, those 
confronting the risk of cyber attacks must necessarily undertake self-protective measures to 
protect themselves. In this section of the article we examine defenses and defensive strategies 
intended to preserve the functioning of a society’s information infrastructures and the systems 
controlled by them. 
(a) “Air gaps” 
As many of the problems of information infrastructures exploitable by adversaries are 
enabled by internet connectivity, one defensive strategy that suggests itself is to keep machines 
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off the global internet. For example, a network intended to carry sensitive military traffic might 
be created, with its own internet protocol (IP) address and domain name system (DNS) 
infrastructures and web servers; as long as there is no interchange with the conventional global 
internet, this can be very effective.123 There are at least two difficulties, however. First, 
replicating an internet is logistically challenging and, therefore, expensive, and to truly “air gap” 
one must prevent all accidental interconnections (e.g., with a laptop connected to the military 
network with a cable and connected to the global internet with WiFi). 
A second issue, also logistical in essence, is that data transfers and updates of software 
must be done in a way that preserves the “air gap,” for example, via storage media such as USB 
memory sticks and CDs or DVDs. As Stuxnet demonstrates, the data transfers must be carried 
out carefully to ensure that there is no hidden malware on the medium, and the individuals 
involved must be trusted to ensure such checking is performed 100% of the time.124 
(b) “Kill switches” 
The “kill switch” idea is that a national authority would have the capability to disconnect 
their nation from the global internet, to disable network-based attacks of various types. As an 
example, consider the directed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against Estonia. If Estonia had a 
kill switch capability, then the floods of external traffic would be cut off. Some engineering 
would be required to accomplish this, notably ensuring that the DNS would continue to work via 
caches and redirections. 
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To engineer such a defensive solution requires that all, or a vast majority, of the network 
resources incorporate a control mechanism by which the national authority can exercise the cut-
off decision. Economics and reliability suggest that minimizing the number of such control 
points makes sense, but this has the unfortunate consequence of creating fewer points that can 
fail before a catastrophe. These control points also create an attractive target for an adversary, 
and by the nature of their role are difficult to test previous to their engagement. 
(c) Special treatment of information systems for critical infrastructure 
Consistent with the observations in subsections (a) and (b), connectivity to the global 
internet enables attacks on critical infrastructures. Imagine, for example, that a bored employee 
at a control point in the electrical power grid connects a personal laptop, tablet, or WiFi-enabled 
smartphone into the building network to access entertainment such as online gaming. There are 
various scenarios, for example, a cellular network/building network bridge, that conceivably 
could provide malware or malicious actors with access to the power grid. 
Here, the right strategy is isolation of the grid control interfaces from the internet and 
machines connected to it. While it is conceptually possible (see subsection (d), below) to have 
application-specific gateways, complexity seems to inevitably creep in and create opportunities 
for malware to overcome the gateway’s role (isolation) in the system design. 
(d) Network-embedded perimeter defenses 
An alternative to physical air gaps is the idea of a packet-filtering gateway or firewall, as 
illustrated in Figure 12.1. A “firewall” is a packet-filtering gateway.125 The typical role of such a 
                                                 
125 WR Cheswick and SM Bellovin, Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker (Boston: Addison-
Wesley, 1994). 
29 
device is to segregate packet traffic into an “inside” and “outside,” where certain activities are 
allowable if originating from the inside but not if originating from the outside. 
Figure 12.1:  Packet-filtering gateways used for network defense 
 
The decisions about what activities are allowable and not allowable is encoded in a 
packet-filtering policy implemented by the firewall. The problem with firewalling as a strategy is 
that many security threats have moved into applications, for example, into interpreters embedded 
into applications such as document formatters and renderers, as well as browsers. “Port 80” (used 
by the Web’s HTTP) cannot be closed, yet much of today’s dangerous material flows in from the 
web. This suggests application gateways that provide extremely constrained interfaces to 
applications, perhaps complemented by one or more packet-filtering gateways. 
(e) Improved software engineering 
A major issue in cyberwarfare is software that can be exploited to perform unwanted 
actions. The very fact that such unwanted actions are feasible is a sign that there are mistakes in 
the software’s design. The discipline of software engineering is intended to produce correct 
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software.126 Software correctness in the context of security means that the right action is 
performed for the right person in the right place at the right time, with no missing functions, 
errors or “extras.” Modern design techniques, such as software development with the aid of 
theorem provers,127 and use of modern programming languages, such as Haskell and OCaml, 
preclude many of the most common errors (e.g., buffer overflows) that pervade software 
implementations.128 While such tools do not guarantee a correct or appropriate design, they 
remove a great deal of low-hanging fruit exploitable by the attacker and allow the defending 
programmer to focus more attention on the software logic, interfaces, and overall design. 
Software engineering has a great deal to offer as a discipline,129 yet it is underutilized as a 
defensive mechanism, not least because market forces pressure developers towards a strategy of 
release early and often that may or may not be wise. Cyber security considerations have very 
limited traction in the marketplace, as there seems to be little in the way of financial gain or 
penalty for writing software that is more secure or less secure. One policy, for better or worse, 
that would create financial incentives for correct functioning would be to create a legal doctrine 
of software liability, involving torts for failures of the software, as well as the inevitable 
documentation of “best-practices” defenses against such torts.130 
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V. CONCLUSION 
At several points in the discussion, the disturbing impression arises that the technology 
has run ahead of the policy thinking in the domain of cyberwar. We make here a few suggestions 
on questions and directions that might lead to informed policy-making in this area. 
International policies and agreements should clarify how cyber actions fit into existing 
international law. Although the Tallinn Manual is a step in the right direction within its scope, 
the more problematic area of espionage remains largely unaddressed. Cyber war’s greater ability 
to deploy latent disruptive capabilities and a greater ability to conduct surveillance will make 
guidelines to determine the propriety of this type of conduct increasingly important in years to 
come.131 
On the technological side, engineers should developed means to ensure reliable 
attribution of actions in cyberspace. In addition, they should develop the technical means to 
distinguish combatants from non-combatants in order to honor distinction and neutrality. If 
developed, these capabilities would make it easier to reconcile cyber war with existing principles 
of international law. 
On a broader level, any proposals should account for the huge social and economic value 
inherent in cooperation, as exemplified by the success of the internet’s federated but cooperative 
architecture. At the same time, they should recognize how a lack of alignment in underlying 
interests, the increase in the number of participants, and the reduced ability to verify others’ 
compliance have the tendency to cause cooperation to break down. In the absence of such 
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cooperation, nation-states may use lawfare as a tool of obstruction in the course of waging total 
war.132 
These are not concrete proposals as such, but rather directions that might result in 
productive discussions by technologists interested in policy issues and policy-makers interested 
in the risks and management challenges associated with a defensive posture in cyber space. 
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